Subjectivism and relativism, and vice versa

Good and evil are neither "relative" nor "subjective".

The colloquial and wrong use of both terms is intended to mean that there is no ethical assessment of every act a part of what each individual wants, decide or ends up giving to it. According to this principle (which, of course, can not be but another kind of ethics, or what else could it be), the dissenting judgements of two different individuals can not be brought together because they respond to different judicative circumstances (psychological and contextual). For the ethics of the unethical, everyone is entitled to act without being held accountable to anyone. This ends up being true throughout the system issued by the capital (although it is not unique to this system), as its guiding principle is the duty of accumulation, a form of individual advantage, against which all other considerations are lower values. Neoliberalism struggles to implement and extend this moral model before which ethics and common sense are continuously scandaled and continuously create obstacles.

But we already know that love is the nucleus and paradigm of the ideological contradictions of the system or, if you will, the most beautiful and perfect, the place where the hidden or internal contradictions become ornament and ostentation. In love, the ethical contradiction is so great that the only solution to avoid draining the strengths of pretending is to make it into to shamelessness. It is in love where capital, forced to impudence, exhibits its starkest sociopathy.

Thus, love’s "relativism" is not so, because the judgement is not relative to anything, which means based on something whose reference makes it an absolute (to have a melon to eat during a day is an amount "relatively "adequate. Its relativity refers us, for example, to the number of people to be eating it. Once you know the number of people, the opinion on its suitability as food for a day will either be absolute or at least with a more reduced relativism). Nor is "subjective" because it is formed into a consciousness connected through the senses with the objectivity of reality and therefore forced to certain forms of objective judgement by that perceived objectivity.

It is said that judgements of love are relative and subjective, meaning that they lack any necessary contact with objectivity. The reference element of relativity is permanently absent. The judgement of love is relative, but it is not to be disclosed in reference to what, so we will never achieve the objectivity that allows us to validate that judgement. Subjectivity, judgemental psyche, disconnects both the senses and the intuition of the evidence, so that the subjective judgement of love becomes the algorithmic product of a black box: the unfathomable love skull.

In reality, the hidden element that deforms both terms is the will as long as it is desiring. The loving judgment is relative (depending on) to the power of a desire that I cannot confess, because in its confession I allow the mystery of the moral correctness of my judgement to be clarified. If I recognize that I judge because I want something, and that something is shameful then I acknowledge that therefore I am being immoral for love and with it, that love is immoral.

The loving judgement is also subjective, because the prism through which the light of reality is filtered has a way unknown to me (that I decide to ignore), and I will never recognize, but whose product I can verify. If I recognize that this light is, again, my inmoral desiring will, I will recognize the impropriety of the judgement itself hidden by the misunderstood relativism.

Both terms are synonymous in colloquial language, and its paradigmatic aim is the discourse of the judgement of love. That is the decoding system to which the individual must appeal in love affairs.

The reason why it is difficult to frame these ethics of non-objectivity in the context of a lack of ethics is that a plethora of conflicting but quite affirmative and concrete standards deeply underlies to the judgement principles of colloquial subjectivism and relativism. This set of rules, as may be expected, presents itself as an expression of a definite and consistent moral. The individual, however, can only intuit it, and her/his efforts to find the hierarchy of its guiding principles will lead back to the intuition through what we might call poetic ethics, where the prephilosophical, intuitive thinking is guided by aesthetic factors, which improves its appearance of unity.

The individual knows that there are things that are good and things that are wrong for love, and seeks for an irreproachable behavior intended to make him worthy of such behavior towards him. The individual is confident that this behaviors exchange adjusted to moral of love permits him to stay guided, understanding the judicative consequences of her/his actions (the opinions that her/his actions generate) and anticipating the actions of others in terms of their moral standing. The individual expects that subjectivism and relativism, as well as the set of contradictory principles that accompany them, point in the same direction, in an even longer and more efficient than the awareness consistency moral attributed to the remaining areas of social life.

Gradually, s/he will find that to which love moral points is something he does not discern, and "subjectivity" will be populated by "relativisms". Her/his need to survive the loving unpredictability of behaviors and judgments will generate a biography of personal contradiction that will constitute the algorithm through which s/he will judge, and which contradictions with the affirmative principles of love will remain hidden behind the curtain of relativism and subjectivity.