I am not
I lack enough information to state categorically the existence or inexistence of substantial sexual remains in shaping our psyche, and to assess in detail what the generative reciprocity is there between sex and gender. But I consider two facts as obvious and crucial.
The first is that it is hugely likely that these vestiges, if any, are not decisive. Because individuals suffer a powerful sociocultural pressure to define their gender and define themselves as rightly belonging to this gender; and since, despite this, the difference is neither extreme nor perfectly formed, it can be assumed that suppressed that pressure, such a bulky part of the difference will also be eliminated that the remaining will be negligible.
The second is that the human being has the virtue as a duty and justice as the virtue which subordinates all others. A decisive stance against gender, including possible unavoidable vestiges, is fair, and it is right to act accordingly because nowasays, as a category, it is substantial in determining the character of the people and the groups they belong to; it becomes a tool of oppression and discrimination.
So, I do not know if the elimination of gender requires a temporary or permanent positive discrimination, in other words, if the denial of gender will make gender disappear completely or leave behind it a gender residual which will have to be weighed sometime. But since we know that gender is oppressive and discriminatory, we assume temporary or definitive compensation as a political obligation. Such compensation should begin with the establishment of formal gender identity: the absolute suppression of gender recognition.
Agamy rejects the proliferation of multiple genders in the idea that the gender itself, and not the kind of gender, is the engine of oppression.
Gender is distinction by arbitrarily obtained criterion (from the moral point of view) of sex, and its function is discriminatory distribution of social roles or, to say it bluntly, oppression. There is, therefore, no good gender underlying an obnoxious use of it. All gender roles are oppressive in one way or another. The individual's personality, his character, should not be determined by gender traits, whatever combination, nor are they who should be the representative of that character.
Agamy considers that all behavior hitherto mediated by a gender trait is likely to be improved by the disappearance of that trait. Also it considers that none of these traits play a necessary role in character, and that it can and should be governed by strict ethical criteria, which means that gender should translate into ethics. If any of the typical gender behaviors or traits are redeemable for a gender-alien character, it will be as a good behavior or trait, but and never as a recovery or partial claim of gender.
Agamy, however, sympathizes with the strategy of multiplying gender as a mechanism to destabilize the category of gender, but believes that this strategy is transient and secondary, being denial of gender and determination of good behavior, primary, and perhaps definitive. The genders multiplication strategy can adopt a self-reproductive commercial character from the time it is emancipated as a goal in itself and stops being critical of the type of genders that creates or claims. Thus it would imitate our merchandise neoliberal model, which is not produced to meet a need whose satisfaction is a good, but to create a desire that becomes a need and seeks to generate immoral consumption.